Will American voters re-elect President Obama?

Or can Mitt Romney offer them a viable alternative? But an alternative to what and why?

As it is generally the case, extraordinary circumstances must be present for an incumbent president to lose re-elections. The last time this happened, President Bush (41st) was fired because of the economy. Bill Clinton rode the spiffy slogan, “It is the economy stupid,” to underscore the need for change.

This election cycle, and by selecting Mitt Romney as their candidate, Republicans seem to use the Clinton strategy against Obama. But how good or bad is the economy in comparison to early 1990's?

The answer may not be relevant or important because Obama could rightly remind Americans that the poor economic conditions did not start under his watch. Also, he could point out that, unlike George W. H. Bush, he did not start the wars that taxed the economy either. His son, a Republican, did. But all these issues could be mooted if the economy were to improve between now and November. In which case, the Republican candidate could fall back on social causes, foreign policy, and defense issues.

While social causes that touch on civil rights and religion are motivating forces for conservative voters Mitt Romney is not seen as a stronger defender of those values. Foreign and defense issues too cannot be used to attack Obama this time for a number of reasons.

First, Romney, in comparison to Obama, does not have the experience or the record that will allow him to challenge Obama’s. Romney’s policy is merely a concept when compared to Obama’s practical steps taken since taking over in 2008.

Second, Obama, despite his promises to end Bush’s policies and practices, he actually continued on the same path. He failed to close Guantanamo, he pursued Bush’s road map for Iraq, he escalated in Afghanistan, he killed the top terrorist, he authorized more drone assassinations than his predecessor, and he took part in the Libya war without putting troops on the ground or committing American resources. This record is a problem for the left but it is hardly "attack-able" by the right given the policies and practices of the previous administration.

In terms of foreign policy, Republicans might attack Obama’s Middle East record. But even that can be easily undermined by simply qualifying it. For instance, Republicans are using the slick slogan “Stand with Israel” to suggest that Obama is not. That slogan too can be taken apart given Obama’s stance in support of Israel even when other western and European countries were prepared to abandon it. For example, Obama defeated Abbas’ efforts to secure UN recognition. He pressured Turkey and Egypt to keep peace with Israel despite the extraordinary changes taking place there. And he aborted or vetoed UNSC resolutions condemning Israeli for issues related to illegal settlements and Gaza War. Republicans could be more accurate and change their slogan into “Stand with Natanyahu.” But that is like asking a liberal politician to love a conservative one, neither party does it and it will be disingenuous to ask Obama to be the first. Natanyahu is simply too conservative, not only for Obama, but for many Israelis and American Jews too.


So comes November, voters will have the option of firing a president whose, economic,  defense, and foreign policies were center-left if not outright conservative practices masked by his liberal credentials or hire Romney who would fire everyone and attempt to turn around an economy that is already turning around. Romney, as fiscal conservative,  would privatize social security and healthcare, outsource the postal service to UPS and FedEx, and bid out  natural resources and infrastructure. 

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Why are Turkey's ruling party leaders struggling in developing a consistent, enduring Middle East policy?

Ahmet Davutoğlu

On Thursday, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu responded to opposition parties’ members of parliament who accused the government of war mongering on Syria. 

“A new Middle East is emerging and we will continue to lead this. Turkey will pioneer this order of peace. … The Turkish people of 74 million are with the Syrian people and will continue to be so… Those who side with dictatorial regimes instead of the people of the Middle East cannot understand our policies. … We stand by people, not minority dictatorships,” Davutoğlu responded.

“What should be said first on Syria is that the Syrian administration is responsible for the current situation in Syria. The culprit is the Baath regime, which orders shooting at people who took to the streets with demands for freedom. … We support the valid demands of the Syrian people, regardless of their religion, sect and ethnicity,” Davutoğlu said.

Analysis

The engineer of the zero conflict with Turkey’s neighbor policy is now promoting direct involvement in the conflicts of the region after struggling to find a comfortable position when the Arab Spring first started. 

For instance, Turkey’s government refused to support Europe and NATO in their campaign to remove Qaddafi from power in Libya. Turkish leaders also struggled to articulate a clear position regarding the Egyptian revolution when it first started. In order to make up for those delayed reactions, Turkey’s ruling leaders are now overreacting. They did not study the various actors involved in the Syrian crisis and they ended up siding with two of the least democratic regimes of the Arab world: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Such a company Turkish leaders are keeping highlights the contradictions in Turkey’s Middle East policy. 

On the one hand, the ruling party claims that they are supporting popular revolutions regardless of sect and ethnicity of the revolting people. But they remain silent about the demands for change in Bahrain—where the uprising preceded the Syrian one until it was crushed by the Saudi military that came to the aid of the minority-run government there. That casts doubt about their sectarian neutrality.  Turkey’s ongoing conflict with the Kurds also challenges their claim to ethnic neutrality.

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What is happening in Iraq?

As soon as the last American fighting solder left Iraq, the government of Nouri al-Maliki hinted that it will work for reconfiguring the government from one that is coalition based to one that is majority based. He also encouraged some lawmakers affiliated with al-Iraqiyya to break away, some did. In the meantime, a court issued an arrest warrant against Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni Vice President, on charges of ordering over 150 terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets.


Al-Hashimi and his family are now under Turkish protection after escaping via Kurdistan>Qatar>Saudi Arabia. Allawi is also out of the country and refuses to return unless al-Maliki steps down. A Kurdish leader, Mas`ud al-Barazani visited the U.S. and Turkey in the last several weeks. On Monday April 23, al-Maliki started a two day visit to Iran.

What caused the Syrian and Yemini uprisings to falter?

Syria: From peaceful uprising to armed rebellion

By all accounts, the success of the uprisings against the old guard in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya was not matched in Yemen and Syria. The failure of the Yemeni and Syrian uprisings to achieve their goals can be explained by the post-revolutions’ events in the Arab Awakening countries and the Gulf States’ meddling therein.

After nearly a year of hard struggle against the authoritarian regimes in the first three Arab Awakening countries, the youth of the revolution were overlooked in the elections due to the efficiency of the political machine of religious parties. In all three countries, Islamists, moderate and otherwise, reaped the fruits of uprisings initiated and realized by apolitical youth who were less interested in ideology and more driven by their yearning for dignity and respect.

But when the dust settled, religious and nationalist groups were able to mobilize their followers and gain control of elected bodies. This trend sent a shock of despair among the youth in Syria and Yemen. They became uninterested in sweating and bleeding for a cause that will be hijacked by Muslim brothers, salafis, and tahriris.

The second factor that contributed to the starving of the uprisings in Syria is the uncharacteristic “support” from the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Syrian youth were not interested in having their fight for dignity sponsored and bankrolled by regimes that have no culture of social justice, shared governance, and respect for human dignity. For many Syrians, it is bizarre that the Saudi family could offer the former dictator of Tunisia protection while calling for Assad’s removal from office. It is inexplicable that the same regime that hospitalized and supported the dictator of Yemen and called for a peaceful, political solution to the crisis there was willing to arm and finance the rebels in Syria. It is disturbing that the same regime that sent military tanks and troops to crush a peaceful uprising in Bahrain wants the UNSC and the Arab League to send troops into Syria. 

Simply put, the Syrian youth who struggled for political rights were not persuaded by the crocodile tears of the ruling families in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Perhaps, when those rulers recognize the human rights of immigrants, respect the dignity of women, and end sectarian and ethnic discrimination in their countries, then, and only then, can they side with the Syrian people and speak on their behalf.

Considering the Saudi involvement in the Syrian crisis, it would seem as if the Saudis gambled on a win-win situation: the removal of Assad whom they despised for many reasons or the derailing of the Arab Awakening. They may have gotten the latter; while depriving the Arab peoples of a chance to transform their world for the better.

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The crisis in Syria is driving a wedge between Turkey and Iran

Despite Turkish politicians’ efforts to downplay the diplomatic rift with Iran, more evidence has emerged suggesting otherwise. The main reason is Turkey’s increased role in supporting the groups that want to topple the regime in Syria. Iran considers that to be a red line and they seem to have communicated that to the Turkish prime minister who visited Tehran last week.

Signs of the cooling off of the Turkish-Iranian relations can also be seen in the lukewarm reception Recep Tayyip Erdogan received. Unlike  previous visits, he was greeted at the airport by the Iranian VP instead of the president. His meeting with the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not conformed until the last minute. When the two finally met, according to Persian media, Khamenei had only one thing to tell the prime minister: Iran will not support the overthrow of Assad.

Nine days before the nuclear talk with the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany), top Iranian officials announced that they are interested in changing the venue of the meeting from Istanbul to Iraq or China. Some of the Iranian officials were explicit about the reason behind the change in venue.

On Wednesday, influential lawmaker Seyed Mohammad Javad Abtahi called on Ahmadinejad's government to choose another place, other than Istanbul, for the upcoming talks with the world power. Abtahi went on to argue that the “Friends of Syria” conference held in Istanbul last week is evidence that Turkey is implementing the West’s policies in the region.

Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezayee, too, called on Tehran's nuclear and foreign policy officials to change the venue of the upcoming talks.

Reacting to these developments, Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief and coordinator of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group told the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, during a phone conversation late April 3, that Baghdad was out of question.

Even if the meeting eventually takes place in Turkey, the diplomatic rift between the two countries would have happened and Syria was the cause of it. Iran, as expected, supported Assad because he was its only reliable Arab ally. Turkey on the other hand, seems to struggle in its reactions to the Arab Spring. Although it took a muted stand toward the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Turkey first opposed NATO’s involvement in Libya and wanted a political solution, not a military one, to the crisis there. When Qaddafi’s regime fell however, Turkey tried to repair its image by supporting the rebels. Apparently, they did not want to make the same mistake in Syria. As soon as demonstrations started, Turkish leaders gave Assad one ultimatum after another leading to the full break of diplomatic relations. Perhaps they thought that the regime will fall fast, too. That did not happen so far and they have many reasons to worry should Assad’s regime survive.

It seems that Turkey picked the wrong time and the wrong side to make a stand against authoritarianism in the Middle East. By supporting armed rebels against the Syrian regime, The Turkish leaders found themselves in the company of only Saudi Arabia and Qatar--even the U.S. is opposed to arming the opposition. These two countries claim that they are interested in democracy in Syria while denying it to their own peoples. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the contradiction cannot be more pronounced: the Saudi rulers mistreat women and minorities. They even sent the military to suppress a peaceful uprising in Bahrain. In Qatar,  14% of the population deny political and civil rights to the 86%. It is the right decision to support genuine political reform in Syria, but Saudi and Qatari rulers are not the company Turkey wants to keep if they want credibility in the Arab street. 

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Why did the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood change their mind about fielding a presidential candidate?

Kairat al-Shater

News analysts and political commentators characterized the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to field a presidential candidate as evidence that the group is willing to betray its own promises for political reasons. They point out other instances of flip-flopping. Immediately after the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) announced that it welcomed the democratic process that will usher in pluralism and end authoritarianism. To help realize that goal, they promised that they will contest only 30% of the parliament seats. Weeks before the elections’ process started, they modified that figure and decided to compete for 50% of the seats. Meanwhile they continued to insist that they will not field a presidential candidate and they will not endorse anyone else. When Abdel Mon`im Abu al-Fotuh, a member of their consultative council, announced his candidacy, they expelled him.

On March 31, the group’s consultative body met and nominated the deputy guide, Khairat al-Shater. Apparently, the decision was divisive with just under half the members voting against the decision. In addition to al-Shater, at least three known Islamists have already announced their candidacy: Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, Abdel Mon`im Abu al-Fotuh, and Mohammed Salim al-Awa.

The four will face off against another four declared candidates: Amr Moussa, Bothaina Kamel, Ahmed Shafik, and Khaled Ali. Given the number of candidates, one would wonder, why did the group field their own candidate instead of endorsing one of the Islamists so that they do not split the Islamists' vote? Two considerations:

First, the Freedom and Justice Party (that originated from the MB) seems confident in its abilities to win elections given the results of the parliament and the shura contests. However, despite the Islamists’ control over the parliament, they were unable to recall the current government. They challenged the military over this issue and they lost. That signaled to them that if the future president were to behave like the military council, their authority will be limited. In a sense, their recent dispute with the military made them realize that if they want actual power, they must have a president they can trust. Apparently, they conducted secret negotiations with a number of candidates (declared and undeclared) and they were not satisfied with what they heard from them.

Second, given the stunning performance of the Salafis in the previous rounds of elections, the MB may have concluded that the Salafi candidate, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, could win. If that were to happen, the Salafis’ 24% share in the parliament will become much more significant (than the 42% of MB) when combined with the political authority of a Salafi president. Ostensibly, the MB did not want to take that chance.

Initially, the MB argued that they don’t want to take over the parliament and the presidency for two main reasons. They did not want to move the country from the one-man rule to the one-party rule and they did not want to face the burden of building a shattered nation on their own. Now, they are on the path of controlling all the branches of government. Those conditions are still a reality and the MB may have achieved what they did not want to achieve.

Collateral victims: U.S. foreign sanctions and domestic policy risks

The case for peoples' diplomacy

by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*

On the occasion of the start of the Persian New Year (Nowrūz), President Obama delivered a recorded video message to the Iranian people. In it, he highlighted the many ways the Iranian government denies its citizens access to information, including censoring media outlets and filtering the Internet. He declared that his administration is committed to communicating with the Iranian people despite the objections of their government “by making it easier for Iranian citizens to get the software and services they need to connect with the rest of the world through modern communications methods.”

As a candidate, Obama insisted—despite harsh criticism from other presidential candidates— that he would reach out to the Iranian leaders and talk to them in order to end the 30 year cold war. During his first year in office, President Obama offered to start a conversation with the Iranian leadership based on mutual respect. He then sent a letter, whose content was not disclosed, to the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. As his first term in office ends, having failed to start any significant dialogue with the Iranian regime, the President outlined a new strategy designed to bypass the Iranian government and religious leaders and talk to the Iranian people directly. Will this strategy succeed? Unlikely; and here are several compelling reasons.