by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*
The Arab Spring that freed some of the peoples of the Middle
East from state imposed fear produced an existential challenge for increasingly
heterogeneous communities, forcing people to define the nature of the state and the
character of the country where they live. It is true that self-rule and
self-determination require a sense of self. However, building stable countries in
the new Middle East is tied to the peoples’ level of awareness of the genocidal
impulse espoused by certain social groups amongst them.
The old Middle East was built on an artificial foundation imposed
by Western colonial and protective powers in the form of superficial liberal
thought, imported Marxist ideas, petty ethnic identities, niggling tribal
structures, and a variety of downwardly managed and imposed ideas. The regimes and
political forces of the pre- and post-colonial periods exerted virtual monopoly
on governing institutions in most Arab countries. During the second half of the
twentieth century, Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, began
to challenge nationalist, monarchical, and clannish regimes arguing that
Islamism provides a more inclusive political ideology for the peoples of the
Middle East than alien ideas or narrow Arabism.
Consequently, Islamists clashed
with secularists (consisting of Arab nationalists, liberals, Marxists,
leftists, etc.) and monarchs and sheikhs. Secularists opposed Islamists on the
basis that only a “neutral” secular state could guarantee equality among all citizens.
Monarchs, on the other hand, either created their own versions of Islamism or
co-opted existing ones to offset the rising popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Arab Spring amplified the tension between these competing
trends. The future of the Middle East in particular and Islamic societies in
general will depend on the outcome of these contestations. Specifically,
political actors must address the place of religion and ethnicity, as defining
identity markers, in the post-Arab Spring countries.
In Tunisia, for instance, all political debates were reduced
to two competing propositions: the civil state versus the shari`ah-compliant
state. It would seem that the consensus, as expressed in the new constitution,
was in favor of a civil state where respect for religion, not any particular interpretation
of Islam, is honored by all and imposed on none.
In Egypt, however, and immediately after the fall of
Mubarak’s regime, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafi allies used their
dominant organizational advantage to privilege a particular interpretation of
Islam over all other interpretations and religions. That project failed and
Egypt reverted to a Mubarak-like regime, for now. Importantly, the opportunity
given to all Islamists to participate in representative governance and the
subsequent failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to foster pluralism relativized
the religious political discourse to the extent that even Salafis embraced
realpolitik and sided with the military against the Muslim Brotherhood.
In Syria, all armed groups were united in their goal to
overthrow the Ba`ath regime but they did not have a unifying vision for the
future. Indeed, the Ba`ath government, as a post-colonial regime, is outdated. However,
based on their own statements, the ideology of the most powerful opposition
groups, the Islamic State (formerly, ISIL), al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front, and
many Islamist groups is beyond outdated. Their ideology is genocidal. These groups call for
an Islamic state that is deviants-free, where non-Muslim citizens are reduced
to a subordinate class, where non-Arabs are perpetually treated as inferior,
and where secular Muslims are designated blasphemous enemies of God. A state
built on these ideas is irresoluble, impracticable, and paradoxical for it violates
the very basic understanding of the universal prohibition on genocide let alone
the universal commitment to honor human dignity everywhere and under all
circumstances.
The implicit support and tolerance of groups like the Islamic
State are utterly disturbing. The lack of outrage towards ISIL’s actions
against vulnerable sectarian and ethnic minorities is shocking. Not only did ISIL
express its intend to kill all those who do not submit to its will, but it broke
new grounds by committing retroactive genocide when it destroyed mosques, graveyards, churches, and iconic religious and cultural structures that echo the
presence of diverse communities from thousands of years past. In a sense, ISIL and its
supporters are committing two-way genocide when they kill or displace minorities
and destroy their ancient historical sites. Considering the atrocities ISIL and
al-Nusra inflict even on each other when they disagree, it becomes clear that these
groups embody unmatched brutality and stunning lack of respect to human dignity
enshrined in universal declarations and treaties prohibiting cruelty and
genocide.
The commonly agreed upon definition of genocide is clear. It
is “the deliberate and systematic extermination of a national, racial,
political, or cultural group.” International law provides specific examples of
acts that are genocidal like killing members of the group, causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Moreover, international law punishes those who commit genocide, conspire to
commit genocide, directly and publicly incite committing genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, and being complicit in genocide.
With these definitions and examples in mind, the
perpetrators of genocide in places like Iraq, Syria, and Libya become numerous.
Responsibility falls on the shoulders of the actual actors who commit these
crimes as well as on the shoulders of those who are complicit—those who are supporting
ideologies that promote and sustain genocidal thought and inspire genocidal
acts.
Post-Arab Spring countries could overcome the genocidal
impulse and combat state imposed fear at the same time when they reject
ideological purity in favor of absolute respect to human dignity. The Arab
Spring, after all, may have signaled the beginning of the end of the precursors
to ideological purity namely exclusionary models of nationalism such as
Arabism, Turkism, Kurdism, Zionism, Berberism, Persianism, Islamism, and all
other forms of ethnicity- and religion-inspired isms. A stable and peaceful
future can be achieved through national identities that are more inclusive and more
egalitarian in terms of respect to rights and dignity.
It is difficult to predict the specific future of the new
Middle East. But it is not difficult to predict that the new Middle East will
be better than the old one. Too much blood and agony have been spent to revert
to the old Middle East or build a mediocre one. In this interconnected global
community, no country can exist in isolation from its neighbors. With that
being the case, the religious and ethnic state models become ethically,
legally, and politically unsustainable. The peoples of the Middle East,
therefore, must reject the proposition that only an Arab state can protect
Arabs, only a Kurdish state can protect Kurds, only a Persian state can protect
Persians, only a Shi`ite state can protect Shi`as, only a Sunni state can
protect Sunnis, only a Christian state can protect Christians, only a Jewish state
can protect Jews, and so-on. Because these ideas eventually lead to genocidal attitudes and acts. Peoples in that region must learn to confront their fear of each other and work together
to build alliances on the basis of mutual respect and mutual commitment to
dignity. They must commit to the principle that surviving or fearing a genocide does not give
any community a legal or moral license to preemptively commit one.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His
most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical
treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions
are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
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