...
I.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following
voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its
Annexes
NUCLEAR
A.
ENRICHMENT,
ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1. Iran's
long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment
and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on
specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years,
to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of
its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in
Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own
long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the
initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran
will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran
will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10
years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in
Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for
enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6
and IR-8
centrifuges, and will commence testing
of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges
after eight and a half years, as
detailed in Annex I.
4. As
Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace
failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture
advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start
to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without
rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA
continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment
and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based
on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to
3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium
enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran
will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre.
International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships
will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six
cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin
without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate
infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four
cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other
centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored
under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During
the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its
uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to
be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer
in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to
natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from
Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted
against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex
I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support
assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as
appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel
produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20%
will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any
additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at
international market prices.
B.
ARAK, HEAVY WATER,
REPROCESSING
8. Iran
will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak,
based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a
form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The
reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for
medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will
not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the
activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the
redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will
be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international
partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other
countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as
the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before
Implementation Day,
conclude an official document which
would define the responsibilities assumed
by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran
plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in
relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced
international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
10. There
will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in
Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to
the international market.
11. Iran
intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and
research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for
in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For
15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent
fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel
reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel
reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed
exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from
irradiated enriched uranium targets.
C.
TRANSPARENCY AND
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
13. Consistent
with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will
provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed
with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully
implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran
will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to
address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as
raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full
implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be
completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will
provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past
and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in
their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution
to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing
the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran
will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for
their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as
set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA
presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran
from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and
surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA
approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment
measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy
resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran
will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium
or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will
cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as
detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.
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