L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1
64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article
17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently
seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of
the President and the Majlis (Parliament).
65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the
Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.
M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN
66.
Iran
will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the
“Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified
by the IAEA in its
regular updates by the
Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this
Roadmap.
N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA
67.
For the
purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years
or longer, for the specified verification measures:
67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment
measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear
sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern
technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will
facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed
measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear
sites.
67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a
long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as
providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at
locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for
working and keeping necessary equipment.
67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to
the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the
JCPOA, and will generally
allow the designation of
inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran,
consistent with its laws
and regulations.
O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)
68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures
that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all
uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is
transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other
future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran
within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such
that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore
concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or
obtained from any other source for 25 years.
P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT
70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous
monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as
necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in
storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as
specified in this Annex.
71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access
as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts
of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.
72.
For 15
years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's
uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.
73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in
line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear
material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, Iran will only engage,
including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and
technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or
enrichment related activities, including related research and development
activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.
Q. ACCESS
74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be
made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and
kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification
responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards
practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military
or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving
concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other
non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for
the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are
without prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol
thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures,
the IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial,
technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information
coming to its knowledge.
75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has
concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the
comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will
provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.
76. If Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns, the
Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the
absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the
reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.
77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the
IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared
nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at
the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.
78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or
activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the
implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or
if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the
absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent
with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original
request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint
Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed
between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the
Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members,
would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process
of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission
would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3
additional days.
R.
CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY
79.
Iran
and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on
centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
80. In this context:
80. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all
existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes
in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item
counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor
tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.
80. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely
flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for
production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to
implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance
on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture
centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.
S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES
81. For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research
and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous
centrifuge technology.[2] Iran
will permit IAEA access
to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D
activities are
consistent with this Annex.
T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
82.
Iran
will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the
development of a nuclear explosive device:
82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to
simulate nuclear explosive devices.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using
multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive
device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and
subject to monitoring.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using
explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray
cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless
approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to
monitoring.
82.
Designing,
developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources
or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.
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