J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS
56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more
than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in
different chemical forms) for 15 years.
57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to
3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down
blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and
delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to
Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran
for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of
300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will
facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this
contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA
fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be
fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred,
based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment
level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot
be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial
transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or
less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) for TRR
fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that
cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to
between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction,
outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6
months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a
commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial transactions should be
structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For 15
years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or
scrap back to UF6.
59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for
use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF6
stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other
sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors,
including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel
load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the
fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet
international standards, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit.
The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of
enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile
parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different
chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work
to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel
and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched uranium
in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in
Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the
modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6
stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission
approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be
readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through
impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through
the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would
be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective
technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working
Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced
in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel
fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint
Commission will also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA
technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification
standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.
60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities
outside Iran for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets.
The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of
this contract. In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel
supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide
(U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran
of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the
reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in
increments no greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be
provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by
the IAEA to have been mixed
with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into
enriched uranium targets. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the
contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide
available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.
K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING
61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran
will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors
suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the
enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1
centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1
centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the
replacement of failed or damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period
from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1
machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by
resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash
rate without exceeding the stock of 500.
63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will
commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year
10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10,
Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its
enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an
above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are needed
for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
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