by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*
Two days before the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution that forced
Hosni Mubarak out on February 11, 2011, the newly elected members of the
Egyptian parliament (Majlis al-sha`b) convened for the first time and
endorsed a member of the Muslim Brethren as speaker. Saad al-Katatni was
elected on Monday receiving 399 votes out of 498 cast.
The 59 year old botany professor was elected to the current parliament
as the representative from the province of Minya (south of Cairo). However, he
is not new to politics. Katatni is a seasoned legislator who served as the
leader of the Muslim Brethren parliamentary bloc between 2005 and 2010, when they
ran as independents because, then, the Islamist movement was not allowed to
field candidates directly.
The Egyptian results, compared to those of similar elections in
Tunisia, Palestine, Iraq, and Turkey suggest that in any fair and transparent
elections in the Islamic world, Islamist parties and their affiliates can
easily win at least 40% of the votes. In fact, in the case of Egypt, Islamist
parties together won over 77% of the seats. These results can be used as
predictors of future elections in other Arab and Islamic countries in the area.
Arguably, if fair elections were in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen, Islamists are likely to win 40% or more of the votes. The question, then,
is no longer whether Islamists could win a majority in elections, but which
strain of Islamism and by how much.
By all accounts, the elections in Egypt were unprecedented. More
than 30 million people voted (over 60% of the eligible voters), and more than
ten million of them voted for the party of the Muslim Brethren, the Freedom and
Justice Party (al-Hurriyya wa-‘l-adala). This margin of victory allows
that party to govern without needing to form a coalition with any of the major
parties. The party won 127 seats through the party list and 108 individual
seats for a total of 235 seats. The parliament consists of 498 elected members,
ten appointed, for a total of 508 seats. They only need about 20 seats to
establish a governing majority. Therefore, the Freedom and Justice Party has
many options to form a majority government.
Regardless of the coalition choices the FJP may make in the next few
days, this body of elected representatives will be tested as it faces a host of
problems during this transition period. Importantly, the leaders of the
parliament must appoint a committee consisting of one hundred members tasked
with drafting the new constitution. The FJP will face pressure from the right as
well as from the left.
The ultraconservative al-Nur party, whose supporters have generally
shunned democracy as un-Islamic, will likely push for the inclusion of explicit
language about the shari`ah being the main source of law in the new
constitution. Liberal politicians and western governments will advocate for a
constitution that favors secularism. It is likely that a compromise will be
struck that will enshrine shari`ah as a main source of law. Short
of that, and if leaders of the parliament cannot reach consensus on this and
other critical issues, the military would likely intervene—a scenario favored
by a number of military leaders.
One thing is certain however: the next Egyptian president will not
be allowed to consolidate power the way Mubarak and his predecessors did in the
past. The Muslim Brethren implicitly endorsed such a plan. First, immediately
after the fall of the regime, that party announced that it will not field a
presidential candidate. The move was interpreted as reassurance to the Egyptian
public and foreign governments that Islamists are not interested in a power
grab. That move did not mean that Islamists are disinterested in the position. Instead,
they are interested in reforming it. Second, all indications show that the
Muslim Brethren favors a ceremonial presidential position and a strong government
under the oversight of the parliament. Ultimately, this divested-power model
might benefit Egyptian society, which has suffered under authoritarian rule
since independence. It may also promote the emergence of autonomous civil
society institutions, which is necessary for accountable government.
The most important achievement of these elections, however,
remains the embrace of the electoral paradigm for the determination of
political legitimacy. Indeed, the ban on Islamists in past turned them into political
martyrs. The Salafis’ rejection of democracy attempted to discredit the
representative governance model. Now, the participation of more than one
Islamist group in local and national elections takes religious absolutism out
of the equation and empowers the people to determine their political leaders
and institutions; that in and by itself is a step in the right direction.
___________
* Prof.
SOUAIAIA teaches at the
University of Iowa. He is the author of the book, Contesting Justice. Opinions
expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest;
not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is
affiliated.
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