by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*
With two superpowers emphatically vetoing three UNSC
resolutions on three different occasions, the world could not be more divided
about the Syrian crisis. World leaders are nonetheless united in their rhetoric
supporting peaceful protest. The Syrian crisis, however, revealed troubling
contradictions in the position taken by key countries. For example, Saudi
Arabia committed itself to arming the Syrian opposition at the same time when
its security forces are killing and imprisoning peaceful
protesters within its boarder. Turkey, too, is involved in providing
support to armed Syrian groups while continuing its ruthless campaign against
what it calls “Kurdish
terrorists.” The U.S. administration is providing “non-lethal” support to
armed Syrian opposition that includes the same groups
that the U.S. troops fought in Iraq. Iran, after praising the Arab Spring for
bringing down long serving authoritarians, failed to tell its Syrian friend
that 42 years of Assad rule is more than enough. These contradictions either
suggest that the virtue of armed rebellion is in the eyes of the beholder or
that non-violent resistance could co-exist with armed rebellion. Both
propositions are problematic.
Trigger-happy groups have always argued that they can change
corrupt regimes quickly and efficiently. The evidence is in Afghanistan and Somalia.
Non-violent uprisings have changed regimes without firing a single bullet and destroying
the fabric of society. The evidence is in Tunisia and Egypt. The first and most
important casualty of the militarization of the Syrian uprising is the
non-violent movement. A report published by the Coordinating
Committees for Democratic Change testifies to this.
Arguably, the most significant achievement of the Tunisian
revolution was not succeeding to bring about regime change. Rather, it was in
changing the regime without resorting to violence. During a visit to Tunisia,
when I was shown what used to be positions of neighborhood committees, I asked
if it would have helped if citizens had guns. My interlocutor, without
hesitation, replied: “thousands of people would have died if people had access
to guns.” That was before the start of
the uprising in Syria. Now, we can assess the truth of that statement.
By all accounts, about 338 people died during the Tunisian revolution
that ousted Ben Ali in about 26 days. In Syria, also during the first month, an
estimated 400 people were killed. As soon as the opposition turned violent (car
bombs, assassinations, and kidnappings), the number of casualties went off the
charts. As armed groups became involved, the regime’s brutality increased under
the pretext of fighting terrorism. By the time the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formally
established in July 2011, dozens of armed militias were already active in at
least three provinces. The FSA justified
its existence with the need for protecting civilians. Since then, the number
people killed jumped to an estimated
21,000 to 28,000 people dead, nearly one million people displaced from their
homes, and thousands of homes and public buildings destroyed. These numbers
show that armed rebellion increased the number of casualties. Furthermore, civilians
are not safer with the presence of the FSA than without them. It can be argued
that FSA’s presence endangered civilians’ lives, risked their property, and threatened
sectarian and ethnic solidarity.
On August 9, 2012, the FSA announced another “tactical retreat”
from Salahuddin neighborhood in Aleppo, leaving behind rubble-filled streets
and destroyed buildings. This last retreat is just the most recent in a series
of many. The FSA failed to free and hold territory that can be considered safe
zones making their main argument a moot point. The FSA militarized the conflict,
giving the regime reason to unleash its unmatched military might.
The FSA claimed that its presence would encourage military
and security personnel to defect. However, according to some FSA leaders, while
many have defected, only a small percentage of them took up arms, with the rest
opting instead to join their families or go into seclusion. In other words, the
defection exacerbated sectarian and ethnic divides. Since the majority of the
defectors are from the Sunni sect, Alawites and Christians will be more
inclined to retain their affiliation with the regime to protect their
communities.
The political discourse adopted by the opposition does not
give assurances to minorities either. Political and military leaders of the
opposition continue to emphasize that the new Syria will be democratic and
inclusive. The experiences of minorities in Lebanon, a country whose sectarian
composition is similar to that of Syria, show that political accommodation—not popular
democracy—can assure them protection. Minorities in Syria are fearful that the
Sunnis would rely on numerical majority to create governing institutions that
will further marginalize them.
Sectarian and ethnic divisions are threatening the entire
region, not just Syria. Sectarianism is taking over the political and
diplomatic discourses in neighboring countries. Islamist rulers in Turkey are
siding with the Saudis and the Qataris to defend Sunnis while executing their
own version of war on terror against their Kurdish minorities. Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia are increasingly abusive of the Shiite communities within their
own borders. In Iraq, sectarian and ethnic reconciliation is imperiled. Lebanese
stability is in a precarious state despite the neutral stance the government
took in regards to the Syrian crisis.
In the end, as Kofi
Annan concluded, the Syrian problem cannot be solved with regional and
world actors holding their current positions. World leaders, especially those
directly involved in arming the opposition and the regime, must be prepared to
compromise if they expect the Syrian foes to coexist. Sectarian and ethnic
groups in Syria, including the Alawites, do not like to be told who their
leaders ought to be. Therefore, a solution that is built on exclusion will not
advance the cause of peace and stability in a fragile region; nor could the
militarization of the conflict. The armed rebellion ended any and all talk
about a peaceful uprising in Syria. Those calling for arming the opposition are
legitimizing violence and destroying the non-violent movement.
___________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed
herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest;
not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is
affiliated.
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