Middle East Politics Reshuffle: The Future of Islam
in the public sphere
by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*
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Ghannouchi to take a major role in Muslim Brotherhood International |
The overthrow of
the Muslim Brotherhood’s government in Egypt on July 3rd, 2013
forced the group’s international leaders to rethink the movements options. This weekend, they
gathered in Turkey. The meetings were closed to the public. The limited
information that leaked out suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood International is not about to change its overall strategy
or replace its aging leaders. Instead, they embraced the old guard again, in
a sign that they are not about to look to the youth to transition to the new century.
They elected Rached Ghannouchi, who presided over the Tunisian Islamist movement for over 32 years, to lead the political bureau. Looking forward, the
movement’s leaders seem interested in limiting the damage of their fall in
Egypt, not in renewing its thinking. There is no indication that they are
looking at the Arab Spring in its proper context.
The removal of
Mohamed Morsi from the presidency in Egypt is just one unexpected turn in an
unpredictable current of events created by the so-called Arab Spring. Just like
the first wave of uprisings, the second uprising in Egypt has created new
trends in Egyptian and Islamic societies. Politicians, especially Islamist ones,
have an opportunity to learn many lessons from these events.
Two things Mohamed
Morsi and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood could have done to save themselves from the
dramatic fall witnessed on July 3, 2013.
First, Morsi
should have ordered parliamentarian elections within the first 60 days of his
presidency. The nullification of the first elections should have been a signal
that the legislative power is very important for Egyptian society and for
interested groups. The legislature plays a double role. It checks the executive
branch and in doing so it bestows legitimacy on the government. The legislative
void had created a deceptively enticing opportunity for politicians, like Morsi,
to consolidate power, which he did, and that cost him the presidency.
Before moving on
to the next point, let’s make something clear: having the legislature in place
is not an absolute guarantee that would have kept the Egyptian military out of
politics. But it would have made it harder for it to get involved. It is a fact
that the military leaders did not like the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power.
They did all they could to remain influential and keep the Muslim Brotherhood
out since the fall of Mubarak. But they also did all they could to keep the
appearance of siding with the people and acting within the “rule of law.” It
was a unique opportunity for them to see millions of people in the squares
calling for the fall of a regime they detested all along. Their bias against
the Brotherhood explains why they gave Morsi three days to work out a solution
with the opposition before they forced him out whereas they gave Mubarak three
long weeks (and nearly 800 deaths).
Second, the
Muslim Brotherhood should not have entered into an alliance with the more
conservative Salafis. Doing so moved it to the right when it needed to move center-left.
Most democratic societies are governed from the center and the Salafis are a
drag to the far right. The party of the Muslim Brotherhood should have worked
harder to establish a healthy working relationship with centrist liberal parties and activists.
The Brotherhood’s alliance with the Salafis did not buy them any favors. After
all, when the end was near, the Salafis have shown that they were better
politicians than the Muslim Brotherhood’s and they sided with the June 30th
protest movement and the military to approve the removal of Morsi.
There is a basis
for the above claims: the actions of the Islamist group in Tunisia, Ennahdha. Like
the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahdha won over 40% of the seats in the first elected
assembly. Ennahdha could have entered into an alliance with other Islamism-oriented
political groups, like the faction of Hachmi Hamdi or other independent members
of the assembly. Instead, they courted center-left parties and established a
governing coalition that minimized the risks of a second wave of protest
despite all the mistakes they have committed since the elections of 2011.
In contrast, and
more like Egypt than Tunisia, Turkey’s AKP party won a slim majority that
allowed it to govern on its own. Because it is governing on its own, and with the
first political crisis, protesters found the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, an easy target. Protesters blamed Erdogan and his party of
authoritarianism and abuse of power. In addition to the immediate economic and
political losses, AKP might suffer a setback in the coming elections unless the
party’s leaders adjust their way of governing and communicating with the
public.
The Egyptian
crisis is a humbling experience for emerging politicians in Islamic societies.
It teaches them to focus more on inclusion and less on power grab, if not for
the sake of their countries, then for the sake of their own political parties.
Globally and
regionally, the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will undoubtedly affect
other regional crises and alliances.
Regionally,
Egypt’s political changes has weakened the alliance between the ruling family in Qatar
and the global Muslim Brotherhood movement represented in Yousef Qaradawi.
Immediately after the military declaration, Qatar’s new Emir sent his
congratulations to the interim Egyptian president. Qaradawi on the other hand,
called on Egyptians to resist the military coup and insisted that Islamic law
prohibits the removal of legitimate leaders.
The Saudi ruling
family, too, acted quickly and recognized the new leadership in Egypt. Days
later, King Abdullah ordered that $5 billion is made available to Egypt. United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait provided another $6 billion together. Those
endorsements and economic aid did not please the conservative religious groups.
The Saudi Salafi satellite televisions and websites sided with Morsi despite
the fact that Egyptian Salafis abandoned him, while Alarabiya took the side of
the military.
While the Syrian
regime felt vindicated that the Brotherhood failed, Iranian officials said that
the military’s involvement in politics is unacceptable and that the new leaders
must meet the demands of the Egyptian people. Although Iran did not call for
the restoration of Morsi’s government, they took a less enthusiastic position
towards a new regime propped up by the military.
Turkey, on the other
hand, threw its full support behind Morsi and insisted that Western governments
take the position that what had happened in Egypt is “an unacceptable military
coup against the legitimate president.”
It is likely
that the fluidity of the situation in the Arab world will force religious
scholars to cease and desist from issuing religious fatwas about political
matters. The best outcome is for Islamists to be included in the political life
and in return they stop using religion and religious institutions to create
different classes of citizenship or to use one’s political affiliation and
one’s political views as a basis for determining one’s standing before God.
Political rights of all citizens should be guaranteed, and that ought to apply
for and against religious-minded individuals and groups. In other words, they
ought to be able to participate in the political affairs of their nations
without them preaching that non-Muslims or Muslims of different sectarian and
ideological persuasions are treated as second class citizens.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University
of Iowa. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not
speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is
affiliated.
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