Breaking
the Cycle: Could Iranian and U.S. officials overcome their mutual distrust?
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Rafsanjani and Khatami |
After inking an interim agreement at the end of 2013,
Iran and the P5+1 must now finalize a final nuclear agreement within six
months. If they fail, U.S. and Iran will relive the cycle of mutual hostility
in which the two countries have been entangled for more than three decades.
Both parties seem eager to break that vicious cycle this time around. Iran has
its own reasons: no actual interest in building nuclear weapons and strong
interest in finding new markets and opportunities for its emerging economy.
Western powers claim that the devastating effects of the harsh economic
sanctions and the election of moderate Iranian president, Hasan Rouhani, are
the main reasons for optimism. Let’s examine both reasons in the context of
historical facts.
Immediately after the 1979 revolution, Iran was
subjected to a devastating war, spearheaded by Saddam Hussein, who was financed
and/or backed by most of the Gulf States and their Western allies, including
the United States. After eight years of war, nearly 300,000 Iranians lost their
lives and Iran’s economy was diminished by an estimated $550 billion. The end
of the war did not bring any relief: Iranian assets were frozen and U.S.
administrations incrementally continued to impose new economic sanctions,
including a comprehensive trade and investment ban on Iran that took effect in
June 1995. Yet, then, too, Iran elected a moderate president: Hashemi Rafsanjani
(major ally and supporter of current president, Hasan Rouhani).
Characterizing the way Iranians perceived the U.S.
administration, on October 25 1996, President Rafsanjani said that the U.S. administration’s
role in the region and posture towards Iran cannot be trusted because the U.S.
is a “wolf in sheep's clothing.”
Two days later, the U.S. administration, which was
then headed by another pragmatic president, Bill Clinton, insisted that he
would like to hold talks with Iran on bilateral differences. A senior White
House official, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, indicated that
the dialogue should focus on “real differences between the two countries such
as Tehran's support to terrorism, its opposition to the Middle East peace
process and its desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction.” (as quoted in Khaleej
Times October 27 1996). Earlier that same week, Pelletreau told business
executives in Dubai that he was “hopeful Washington would begin a dialogue with
Tehran within the next four years if U.S. President Bill Clinton is re-elected
in November.”
Reacting to this overture, the daily Iran News,
which reflected the views of Iran's foreign ministry, said a win by Clinton and
an administration reshuffle during a second term “could pave the way for
reduced hostility in U.S. foreign policy [towards Iran].”
The conservative daily Jomhuri Eslami, on the other
hand, blasted Pelletreau's remarks as an “election publicity ploy used by Clinton
for domestic consumption. This is not the first time that Washington officials
have requested dialogue with Tehran and, naturally, they will not get a
positive answer this time either,” wrote the daily quoting an unnamed informed
official.
Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, too, downplayed the
prospects of a meaningful change in U.S. policies towards his country: “The
American politicians' mistake was to use this method 9threats] against a
powerful and self-reliant entity such as the Iranian nation. Even if there were
10 powers such as America in the world confronting such a nation, they could
not bring any harm to this nation. Where we can in the world we will expose
injustices perpetrated by America. And everywhere, we will be on the side of
those oppressed by arrogance.”
In November of 1996, Bill Clinton was elected to a
second term. He had about one year to work with Rafsanjani, who was in his
second term and constitutionally barred from running again, to settle some of
their differences. He did not take that opportunity. Still, Iranians elected
another “moderate” president, Mohammad Khatami, a former minister of culture, who
would govern for two consecutive terms. Still nothing happened. The
administration’s desire to enter into a dialogue with Iran was torpedoed by
legislative actions adding more sanctions, which gave credence to opponents of normalization, and by accusations that Iran was involved in the bombing of the
U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Still the White House remained hopeful, without
initiating any actual steps that could break the ice.
On May 29 1997, President Clinton described the
landslide election in Iran of “moderate” president as ``interesting and hopeful.”
He called it “a reaffirmation of the democratic process there.” Clinton, again
stressed that what “we hope for is a reconciliation with a country that does
not believe that terrorism is a legitimate extension of political
philosophies.” But these reconciliatory words were undone by Congress.
A group of senators, including then Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott, suggested that President Bill Clinton ought to intensify
U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, not scale it back. “We urge you to maintain and
intensify your efforts to isolate the Iranian regime through diplomacy and
multilateral fora, since there is simply no reasonable cause to believe this
regime can be reformed from within,” they said in the letter to Clinton, signed
by 10 senators and dated February 10 1997.
An aide to Senator Alfonse D'Amato, who sponsored
U.S. sanctions bill against foreign companies investing in Iran, slammed
European nations for not backing the measures. Gregg Rickman, D'Amato's
legislative director, declared that “if our friends in Europe wish to deal with
the devil then so be it. Europe can either be part of the problem or part of
the solution.”
The legislative measures were not a reflection of
public will, American experts’ recommendations, or world community inclination.
As Reuters reported (October 29 1996), “unilateral sanctions imposed by the United
States on Iran were condemned by all sides, including a former senior White
House official.”
A former aide to President Carter during the 1979
Iranian hostage crisis warned that the measures would do little to combat
terrorism and threatened to backfire if oil supplies run short. “There is no
evidence whatsoever that the actions taken will remedy those problems,” said
Gary Sick. He added that “the effect of imposing a ban on Iran has been to
reduce spare [oil output] capacity in the world.” He argued that “if we have
another oil crisis people will discover these sanctions were counterproductive.”
France, a major ally then and now, defended on May
20 1997 the right of its oil companies to sign contracts with Iran despite
unilateral U.S. sanctions, saying that Tehran “was not subject to any international
embargo.” Interestingly, this week (February 11, 2014), the French president,
Francois Hollande also defended French businesses’ rush to seek investing
opportunities in Iran when President Obama reminded him that the sanctions are
still in place.
White House overtures did not go anywhere because of
increased sanctions imposed by Congress and because of Saudi Arabia’s attempts
to link Iran to terrorist acts that killed American troops in the Kingdom. In
June of 1996, a bomb attack killed 19 American airmen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
A report in the Washington Post linked Iran to this bombing citing Saudi
security officials’ claim that characterized the attack as “a broad conspiracy
backed by Iran.” When asked to comment on the report, then U.S. Defense Secretary
William Perry said that “the U.S. has not found a culprit for the bombing and have
reached no conclusions about who was responsible for this.”
President Clinton, too, said on December 13 1996
that “the investigation is not completed. I have not been presented with any
final conclusions.” Five months later (April 21 1997), the new Defense
Secretary William Cohen said that the “evidence concerning the Khobar Towers
bombing thus far is fragmentary, incomplete and very circumstantial. We do not
have any concrete evidence of any country being directly linked to the
bombing.”
It became clear with time that no government was
actually behind this attack and that Saudi Arabia may have wanted to accuse
Iran to dispel any perception that the Kingdom is an incubator of extremism. It
took years before intelligence officials began to suspect that al-Qaeda or
groups affiliated with and/or inspired by it could be behind the attack.
Revising the events of that decade underscores the
cycle of distrust that paralyzed the two nations’ leaders. Hope for normalization
of ties with Iran evaporated under the heat of regional and internal politics.
Each side found reasons to mistrust the other. The 1990’s was a decade lost and
the presence of three pragmatic presidents in Iran and the U.S. was an
opportunity wasted.
The opportunities of that decade were lost but the
same exact circumstances are presenting themselves again now. A pragmatic president
occupies the White House, a moderate president in Tehran, a common global
threat represented by al-Qaeda, and a challenging deadly crisis in Syria. Will
both sides recognize the pattern and try to end the cycle of mistrust or will
past grievances and unhealthy pride derail the efforts that are now underway.
Looking at past statements, it would appear that
both sides are held hostage to the circumstances that drove them apart. They
are recycling the same claims and counter claims when they need to focus on the
moment they are given and on the possibilities ahead of them. In both
countries, leaders who tried to work out their differences two decades ago are
still around: they are institutions of authority in of themselves and a repository
of firsthand knowledge about international affairs. Perhaps President Obama and
President Rouhani could call on Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, Hashemi Rafsanjani,
and Mohammed Khatami—a tiny club of former “moderate” presidents, to sit down
outside the confines of governing institutions and talk about their respective
grievances, fears, and hopes and make recommendations to the two governments to solve this dispute once and for
all.
With the rise of sectarianism, threats to minority
communities, and the new conditions produced by the Arab Spring, Iran’s role in
bringing stability to that region is undeniably crucial. In Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, Iran could play a stabilizing role. Dialing
down the rhetoric and backing off from confrontational postures between the
U.S. and Iran is good for the two countries, for the region, and for the world.
The two countries can start a new chapter if they commit themselves to the
principle of mutual respect. A settlement of this running feud would free both
governments to focus on building opportunities for their respective peoples,
not building weapons of killing and destruction. Attempting to bypass Iran
during this unpredictable times amounts to willful forgetfulness of the
immediate past and stunning ignorance of the facts.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of
Iowa. His most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in
Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical treatment of
rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions are the
author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
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