Algeria was destined to become an African powerhouse. The
largest country in the continent, it is populated by only 39 million people but
endowed with huge natural resources: 159 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and 12.2
billion barrels of proven natural gas and oil reserves, respectively, and vast expanses
of land, desert, and mountains. A country rich with such resources should not
have a problem building a sustainable economy. However, corruption and a brutal
civil war similar to the one going on in Syria transformed Algeria into Africa’s
most disappointing state. How and why did such a promising country sink so low?
The first reason is systemic corruption and gross mismanagement.
Since independence, Algeria embraced a state-managed economy and political
system. The government confiscated private land, nationalized natural resources
and exerted a monopoly on economic institutions. By mid-1980s, the government
was essentially bankrupt. To stimulate economic growth, President Chedli Ben
Djedid liberalized the economy, privatized some economic sectors, returned some
land to its original owners, and democratized the political system, allowing
political parties to challenge the ruling party that had monopolized power
since independence.
In a series of elections that started in 1989 and continued
through 1991, the Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS) won overwhelming majorities,
which upset France—its former colonial occupier—and France’s Algerian allies,
prompting the Algerian military to sideline the president, cancel the second
round of elections (scheduled for early 1992), and establish a governing
military junta. These actions started a 10-year intense civil war that killed an
estimated 200,000 people and devastated the economy. When first elected in
1999, Abdelaziz Boutaflika issued an amnesty that encouraged some fighters to
lay down their arms, but low-intensity confrontation continued until this day.
On April 17, 2014, Algerians, perhaps still traumatized by
the civil war, voted for a president who is too ill to deliver a single
campaign speech let alone run the country. The scene of Bouteflika being wheeled
into a polling station to cast his vote for himself as did 82% of eligible
voters (unverifiable government figures) indicates that Algeria has lost hope and
is clinging to the past. The psychology of Algerians voting
for an ailing president may explain the desire of many Syrians to stick with
President Bashar Assad.
Although Assad is in much better health and control over a
better military, governing during and after the civil war will be a herculean
task for many reasons.
First, Syria never had and never will have the natural
resources Algeria has enjoyed. Second, unlike the Algerian rebel fighters who
fought from the mountains, Syrian rebels occupied cities and towns turning
civilian areas into war zones. Third, while Algerian rebels were Sunni Islamists
fighting secular Sunni Muslims, Syrian rebels are extremist Sunnis fighting moderate
Sunni Muslims, Shi`ites, Nusayris, Druze, Christians, and anyone else who is not
on their side.
The Algerian conflict was, to some extent, a national one.
The conflict in Syria is a proxy war involving regional and global powers.
Moreover, the Syrian war has turned into a religious war authorized by the
spiritual guides of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement, like Qaradawi, and of the fighting Salafi groups. Algeria was not declared “land of Jihad”;
and Western powers did not join al-Qaeda in an effort to overthrow the government
of Algeria the way they have been doing in Syria.
Given these key differences, it is unlikely that the Syrian
war will be shorter than the Algerian one. Ending Syria’s a war must involve
more actors and more governments, an unlikely scenario at this time. This means
that Syria’s war will likely last more than a decade, will kill more than
500,000 people, will displace more than 10 million people, and will cost at least
one trillion dollars—a huge cost not only for Syria but for the world. This
much we can project based on what we have learned from Algeria’s civil war.
Preventing this from happening depends on all actors to change their calculus
immediately and do all that is in their power to stop the war in Syria.
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* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His
most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical
treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions
are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
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