![]() |
Syrians vote, June 3, 2014. |
Most Western governments and some observers argue that the
elections that took place in Syria on June 3, 2014 were not legitimate because
not all Syrians were able (or willing) to participate, they were held under war
conditions, and Syrians were coerced into voting for the current president. These
would be reasonable arguments if they were consistently applied. A brief
examination of similar cases and relevant facts reveals that this is not the
case.
First, U.S. administrations have overseen numerous elections
and produced national constitutions under war conditions and in the middle of
sectarian strife in Afghanistan and Iraq. Administration officials have often
argued that even under these circumstances, elections and referendums are necessary
to instill democratic tradition, isolate extremists, and legitimize
governments. Are these functions of democracy not applicable in Syria?
Second, 56 percent of Egyptian voters did not take part in
the recent elections that endorsed former military chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.
Moreover, al-Sisi came to power after overthrowing a president who was legitimately
elected by higher voter participation and who faced stronger challengers. Yet
the U.S. administration, the rulers of Saudi Arabia, and many Western
governments readily embraced al-Sisi despite his weak mandate, the
extraordinary events that preceded the elections, and the harsh measures
(introduced under his watch) that stifled dissent and criminalized journalists
and members of the opposition.
Third, contending that Syrians voted the way they did
because they were fearful and coerced is an insult to all Syrians, both those
who voted and those who did not vote. Such a contention depicts them as cowards,
incapable of making proper decisions without outside help. Syrians, who have
been living under extreme conditions for more than three years now, could have
chosen to stay at home (as some did) instead of risking their lives to put a
dot of ink on a piece of paper. After all, most Syrians knew that Bashar
al-Assad would win and that the West would not recognize the results. But many
Syrians, for a myriad of reasons, wanted to vote for al-Assad. It is important
to remember that earlier studies commissioned by NATO and Western entities predicted
that Assad would win by about 60 percent, which explains why elections were not
part of any political solution supported by the Western governments. Instead,
they favored a negotiated power transfer to an opposition coalition that
represents less than 4 percent of the population.
There are many reasons why Syrians enthusiastically thronged
polling stations inside and outside Syria to vote for al-Assad, some literally
with their own blood instead of ink. With instability, civil wars, and weak
governments resulting from short-sighted Western meddling, it is understandable
that many people in the Middle East prefer to spite the U.S. and its rich Arab allies
by voting for the person most disliked by the West.
Instead of considering the actual facts and motives, U.S.
administration officials, the French government, and rulers of some of the Gulf
States continue to ignore the will and welfare of the Syrian people without
providing credible alternatives. They claim that Bashar al-Assad is out of
touch and has lost legitimacy. Let’s consider some specifics.
On the same day the Syrian government announced the results
of the presidential elections in which 88% of Syrian voters, with 73% turnout,
elected Bashar al-Assad, Secretary Kerry arrived in Lebanon. Speaking in
Beirut, he declared that “the elections [in Syria] are non-elections. A great
big zero… Nothing has changed between the day before the election and after.”
Ironically for someone who described President Assad as out
of touch with reality, Kerry was speaking in a country that has had no
president for two weeks now (a situation that may persist for months), was without
any government for more than ten months, and whose lawmakers decided to give
themselves a 16-month extension of their term (presumably will now end in
November 2014). That willful cognitive dissonance is symptomatic of Western
governments’ utter failure to present a credible alternative even as they criticize
the governments and governmental processes of countries they do not like. Moreover,
some of the countries they are propping up as acceptable models are not even
functional, let alone democratic and stable.
First, Iraq, which just held its first post-U.S. occupation
legislative elections, continues to struggle with security, economic, and
political challenges. Because of the strange power-sharing arrangement
introduced under the watch of Western occupation forces, Iraq has a parliament
deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, and ideological lines, making it
difficult to form a strong and stable government in the near future.
Second, Libya, “freed” from Qaddafi’s grip three years ago by
an alliance between Qatar (which financed and armed rebel groups) and NATO (which
provided the airpower) is facing its own civil war, pitting secular military
generals against Islamist armed groups, some of whom are affiliated with
al-Qaeda. Moreover, instability and availability of all kinds of weapons in the
hands of all kinds of armed groups are threatening the stability of neighboring
countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria—three countries with fragile governments
and strong presence of al-Qaeda affiliates.
Third, other Arab allies of the U.S. are exemplars of
tyranny and authoritarianism, not responsible governance. These allies include countries
like Bahrain which continues to abuse peaceful protesters, Saudi Arabia which
criminalizes dissent and jails human rights activists, and Qatar which imprisons
poets and abuses foreign laborers and immigrants. None of these countries have
held elections—farcical or otherwise. Those three countries in particular have
no tradition of representative governance and some of their religious
authorities have even decreed that elections are proscribed based on their
interpretation of Islamic law.
Historically, the U.S. administration and its main regional
ally, Saudi Arabia, have promoted custom-made, top-down controlled models of
governance where they balance power by rewarding warlords and ethnic and
religious factions with tools that paralyze governments instead of making them
functional. The 1989 Ta`if Agreement, which changed the power-sharing formula
in Lebanon, and the constitution of Iraq, inked under the watch of U.S. forces,
are good examples of tightly tailored political tools that cannot allow for the
emergence of governments empowered by the people. Instead, these tools produce
regimes that are dependent on regional or international backers.
All this ultimately shows that U.S. foreign policymakers are
willing to support anti-democratic and ultimately unstable governments instead
of investing in, and accepting the consequences of, participatory democracies.
Though the U.S. may not like the short-term outcomes of developing democratic
processes, it is in everyone’s long-term interest to stop purposefully
undermining—whether by intentionally booby-trapping or by rejecting the
legitimacy of—those political processes.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His
most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical
treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions
are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
No comments:
Write commentsShare your thoughts...