Politics is the art of
compromise. Successful politicians rarely give ultimatums because doing so
would limit their ability to navigate complex issues. In 2012, President Obama underestimated
the complexity of the crisis in Syria. He drew a “red line” for President
Assad: the use of chemical weapons would have “enormous consequences” and would
“change [his] calculus” on American military intervention in Syria’s civil war.
A year later, someone used weaponized chemicals, killing hundreds of civilians.
Although no investigation was conducted to identify the perpetrator at that
time, the U.S., encouraged by its regional allies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
Turkey, accused the government of Bashar al-Assad. Just days before world
leaders were to meet in New York, U.S. bombing of Syria was all but certain.
Then two key events changed the course of history. First, Prime Minister David
Cameron, initially supportive of military intervention, was restrained by the
British parliament. As of September 7, 2013, the U.S. Congress was also set to
not authorize the use of force in Syria, especially if it was not authorized by
the UNSC. Second, U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, made a “silly mistake”,
to borrow the words of some observers.
On Monday, September 9,
2013, Kerry, then on his way to a meeting in Europe, made the gaffe that saved
his boss. Answering a reporter’s question, he said that Assad could avoid an
American attack by turning over “every single bit of his chemical weapons to
the international community in the next week.” The State Department tried to
take back Kerry's comments by saying that he “was making a rhetorical argument
about the impossibility and unlikelihood of Assad turning over chemical weapons
he has denied he used.” Nonetheless, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, put Kerry
in check: Moscow urged Syria to place
its chemical weapons under international control. The next day, the Syrian
government “welcomed” Russia’s proposal. The U.S. Senate, having scheduled a
vote for Wednesday on whether to back a proposed punitive strike, postponed it.
The U.S.-planned “surgical strike” against Syria did not take place.
In hindsight, and given
the abysmal results of the yearlong airstrikes on ISIL, the U.S. administration
should be thankful for Russia’s intervention that allowed Obama to save face,
while eliminating a dangerous weapon that could be used by the Syrian
government or its opponents if storing facilities fell under their control. Above
all, Russia’s plan for Syria’s chemical weapons was a lifeline for President
Obama, who was headed for defeat, at least in the House, on his request for
approval for military action.
Fast-forward to
September 2015. Russia, once again, might be offering the U.S. and its allies a
lifeline: an opening to chart a new course for its military and political plans
in Syria. Clearly, U.S. bombardment of ISIL positions from the air is not
producing any significant results, and the U.S. cannot find a reliable
“moderate” partner that could hold cleared territory.
Since the start of the
Syrian crisis, the U.S. and its regional allies—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
Turkey—have insisted that Bashar al-Assad must step down before they stop their
support for rebel fighters. In fact, the AKP-led Turkish government has
insisted that it would not fight ISIL unless it and its allies are allowed to fight
the Syrian government troops as well. In other words, working with the Syrian government
to combat terrorism is out of the question in the eyes of these governments.
Russia, on the other hand, has insisted that fighting terror groups in Syria must
be a priority and must be coordinated with the Syrian government.
There is a growing body
of evidence pointing to the fact that U.S.-Saudi position is untenable.
First, Turkey is now
fighting its own war on terror at home. ISIL suicide bombers have killed
Turkish citizens inside Turkey. The AKP government chose to re-open its war on
Kurdish fighters and ignore the threats posed by ISIL. Some Turkish towns are
now off-limits to Turkish government forces.
Second, the U.S. planto train and equip “moderate” rebel fighters and use them to fight ISIL on the
ground in Syria has failed in a spectacular way: the first group of fighters
inserted into Syria was immediately attacked by al-Nusra, killing many of its
members and capturing the rest. Moreover, a leader of this U.S.-trained group
declared that his fighters will never attack their “brothers in jihad,” which
of course would include ISIL.
Third, al-Nusra has
been reluctant to enter into open war against ISIL. Last week, al-Nusra’s overall
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ordered the group to cooperate with ISIL, despite
his rejection of ISIL’s declared restoration of the caliphate under the
leadership of al-Baghdadi.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia has
claimed that Assad lost legitimacy because he has killed civilians in Syria.
Now that Saudi Arabia is bombing civilians in Yemen and siding with an
unelected ruler of that country, they have lost that moral high ground. The
Saudis, Qataris, Bahrainis, and Emaritis are all involved in an illegal brutal
war. It is also possible that that Saudi Arabia will lose territory to the
Houthis before the war on Yemen is over. The Saudi rulers themselves might face
serious criminal charges since they stand accused of committing war crimes in Yemen.
Fifth, the refugee crisis
is spreading to Europe, and the longer the crisis in Syria is made to last the
more people will be leaving that country. Only an end to the violence and the
creation of an international recovery plan could stop the flow of refugees. The
countries that supported the armed rebellion are responsible for the
humanitarian disaster and for recovery costs.
Sixth, even if
President Assad were to step down or be removed, there is no evidence that members
of the warring factions will stop fighting, lay down their arms, and go back to
doing what they were doing before the crisis. Events in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen
indicate that armed groups are intent on taking over and holding territories.
These non-state actors are not wrestling away control over towns and cities from
government forces only, but also from each other. These groups do not believe
in the devolution of power, they want all power for themselves forever and through
the gun.
The war in Syria is a
classic proxy war going bad. Too many states have too many proxy fighters all
fighting the Syrian state and each other. Relying on non-state actors to carry
out violence against the state is a dangerous and destabilizing strategy that
will affect not only the target country, but other nations in the region and around
the world. Violence will reach neighboring nations like Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan and the refugee crisis will continue to affect Western
countries. The war in Syria and Iraq must end in order to minimize the spread
of violence and the increased number of displaced people. However, for the war
to end, states party to this conflict must employ both military and political
strategies concurrently—not just one or the other.
The concurrent military
and political solution is necessitated by the following facts:
1. The Syrian government
will not be able to re-establish pre-crisis conditions. Too many people have
died, too many people have been displaced, there has been too much destruction,
and there is too little trust and good will—making it impossible to start a
reconciliation and recovery phase without the inclusion of local leaders.
2. Syria has been
flooded with all kinds of weapons and ammunition, making the task of keeping
peace and order all over Syria a herculean one. The government will need some
of the armed groups to manage some of the towns and cities that were outside
the control of the Syrian state.
3. Syria has always
been a mixed society. The country consists of an amalgam of sectarian, religious,
ethnic, and tribal communities. During the crisis, and when the government
failed to protect all citizens in all of Syria, these communities armed their
own local committees (lijan sha`biyya/difa` dhati) to defend their towns
and cities of residence. It is unlikely that these traumatized communities will
disarm immediately and trust their fate to this or a future government—with or
without Assad.
4. While some armed
groups are interested in preserving the diversity of the Syrian society, other
fighters who embrace and practice genocidal ideas, like ISIL, al-Nusra, and Ahrar al-Sham are determined to cleanse
the regions they control of ethnic, sectarian, religious, secular, and any
group that is not them. Moreover, these genocidal groups do not believe in any
degree of public participation in electing regional or national political and
administrative leaders.
These facts create a
set of conditions and variables that require a concurrent military and
political solution. A solution that supports the national government’s fight
against genocidal fighters and put Syria on a path to deliberate devolution of
power. The devolution of power could be achieved through purposeful political
reform that would allow towns and cities a healthy degree of autonomy without
risking the territorial integrity of their country and the abrupt collapse of
the state. The fate and future of Assad and his government can be determined
after local governments have been established, through national elections
under a new constitution that reflects the new conditions.
The Russian military buildup
in Syria might provide the world community with an opportunity to start an
effective collective plan of action in Syria. The Western coalition that has
been bombing ISIL from the air for more than one year without success could
have another partner, who is not the Assad regime, on the ground. Russian troops
could open the necessary channel of communication between the Western coalition
and the Syrian government. Together, and after securing authorization from and
monitoring by the UNSC, the Syrian and Russian troops could secure local
elections in towns and cities freed from genocidal fighters. These local
elections will provide some opposition figures with a chance to gain power, through
the ballet box, over regions where they have influence and if they have
influence.
This approach will
necessarily mean that Kurdish regions, Shia towns and cities, and tribal
communities (`asha’ir) will emerge as self-governing, semi-autonomous
regions within Syria. This kind of solution would preserve Syria’s state
institutions, offer Syria’s minorities a degree of self-rule, and fight
genocidal warriors. A Saudi-Western solution preconditioned on the removal of
Assad and his generals will cause the disintegration of Syria, the permanent
displacement of millions of Syrians, and the spread of violence to neighboring
states. In the end, peace in Syria depends on a gradual devolution of power and diminished use of violence by non-state actors. It cannot depend on using those
non-state actors simply as tools for regime change.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His
most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical
treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions
are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
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