Turkey’s elections,
despite the difficult circumstances and some of the intimidating practices
against Kurdish voters and the media, are victory for those who believe in an
empowered citizenship and peaceful transition of power. This is especially
important because, in Islamic societies, fostering shared governance and strengthening democratic institutions are urgent needed. Participation in elections
is powerful rebuke to those who believe in changing political order through
violence and military coups. I do not speak the Turkish language, therefore, I
cannot claim that I know the motives of the Turkish voters.
However, statistics and persistent trends suggest that the winners of these
elections should not use it to continue ignoring voices of dissent.
First, Turkish
nationalism is retreating before religious conservatism. During these redo
elections, the AKP siphoned more public support from the Nationalist Movement
party (MHP) than from any other party. Voters' support for MHP dropped to 11.96%
from 16.5% (June’s results).
Despite strong
voters’ turnout, the AKP failed to surpass the 50% barrier. It is clear
that Islamist parties enjoy wide support but not a majority support in most Islamic societies. Under fair
conditions, Islamist parties in majority Muslim countries seem to enjoy support
from the low 20's to the high 40's. The November 1 results confirmed that level of support.
It will be a mistake to
downplay the implications of the results of the June 7 elections and overstate
the implications of the results of the November 1 elections. Since both rounds
of elections are equally legitimate, voters’ preference is equally compelling. The
snap elections were needed because the Turkish president did not like the results of the June 7
elections. In fact, leaders of the AKP will be better served by looking at the
November elections results as a second chance granted to them by the voters to
reconsider some of the party’s policies and priorities.
Although the AKP
regained its majority, securing 49.34% of the votes, AKP leaders must not
overstate the public support since most of the seats that allowed them to build
their majority actually belonged to other parties that did not surpass the 10%
threshold. The effects of the high threshold cannot be overstated. To
illustrate the effects of the high threshold, consider the following fact: a party that wins 30 seats
but receives only 9.99% of the national vote, would forfeit those 30 seats. Those seats
will be awarded to the parties above the threshold, proportionally, giving advantage
to larger parties, in this case, the AKP.
Considering the results
of the June and November elections, together, suggests that the Turkish people
want stability but they do not want the current president to grab more power.
The Turkish voters did not give his party the needed number of seats to amend
the constitution or even call for a referendum authorizing the presidential
system, as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan desires. The AKP needed 367 seats to change the
constitution directly or 330 seats to call a referendum to put any changes to a
popular vote. Voters did not drive the AKP support past any of those minimums. In
theory, the AKP, with its current 317 seats, could secure the support of just 13 parliamentarians
to call for a referendum, and that support could come from MHP. Leaders of the
AKP managed to convince members of that party to serve in the interim
government, violating their party's leadership instructions. The AKP could do the same again for the specific purpose of amending the constitution by offering MHP parliamentarians cabinet
positions. Regardless, since the current prime minister cannot challenge the
founder of his party, Erdoğan, the latter will act as a de facto executive president with
or without a constitutional amendment. And that would go against the wishes of the voters.
Because
they have been in charge, leaders of the AKP took credit for the success from 2002 to 2010. Since the start of the
so-called Arab Spring, Turkey’s foreign policy and economy faced serious challenges. It is obvious that Turkey’s economy is now slowing down and the country’s
relation with its neighbors is strained. It is possible that Turkish voters do
not approve of the current policies but they have confidence in the leaders of the AKP to change course. They ought to take that possibility seriously if they want long term success and stability for their country and party.
With a mandate for the
AKP to govern on its own, and should this government continue the same policies
that caused some problems for Turkey, the AKP could lose its support by 2019
since there will be no one else to blame. That is why some experts on international affairs, and even
AKP party members, thought that a unity or coalition government based on the June elections
results would have been better for Turkey and even for the AKP, given
the domestic and foreign challenges the country now faces.
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* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His
most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical
treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions
are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the
university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.
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