
Although its support went to all groups fighting the
Syrian government because it prioritized the overthrow of Assad over all other matters,
including fighting terrorism, the Turkish government offered special support to
Islamists including al-Nusra Front and ISIL. It did so for sectarian and
ideological reasons, but also for practical reasons: ISIL and al-Nusra were the
strongest fighting groups in Syria and Assad’s government cannot be ousted
without them.
Five years later, and when Russia threw its military weight
behind Assad, the Turkish government came to the realization that Assad is, and
will remain, for the near future at least, a “key actor” who would play a role
in any political solution for the Syrian crisis. That is when Erdoğan decided
to adjust his strategy and work with Russia, instead of against it, to preserve some level of influence over the future of Syria.
Syria is important for Turkey because of their shared
problems and concerns: the status of the Kurdish people in both countries
forced them to work together in the past, and will force them to work together
in the future. In other words, Turkey has no choice but to remain engaged in
dealing with the Syrian crisis.
Adjusting the Turkish strategy will necessarily have significant
effects on Turkish relations with Islamist fighters in Syria. Will Turkey abandon
them?
The answer can be drawn from Erdoğan’s history. He is
a very skilled politician who is willing to sacrifice old alliances in favor of
better ones. If his alliance with Islamists becomes a burden, Erdoğan will dump
them. Consider his alliance with Fethullah Gülen for proof.
Part of the credit for AKP and Erdoğan’s rise to power
goes to the role played by Gülen and his movement. Yet, a decade later, when Erdoğan
wanted to consolidate his power, he took steps to control that movement and its
institutions. Gülen became aware of Erdoğan’s thirst for more power and he
resisted him covertly at first. Erdoğan decided to bring him home where he can better
control him. So on June 14, while speaking at a public event organized by a Gülen organization, he issued a public invitation, telling Gülen “it is time to come home.” Gülen, perhaps
aware of the risks, tearfully declined the invitation on June 16, saying, in essence,
not yet.
Four years later, Gülen stands accused by Erdoğan of
being the mastermind of the failed military coup. Had Gülen accepted the
invitation then, he would be in prison now, without creating a diplomatic and
legal crisis with the U.S. administration, which is refusing to extradite him at
this point.
Erdoğan, is the kind of politician who knows how to
survive and will do whatever it takes to not just survive, but reverse losses
and thrive. For this reason, Erdoğan is not only capable of abandoning his
Islamist fighters in Syria, he could launch a military campaign to eradicate
them altogether, and throw their Turkish supporters in prison. Justifying such actions will not be that difficult either. Terrorist attacks, like yesterday's, are enough to turn the Turkish public against all Syrian opposition fighters and create a new path toward reconciliation with a Syrian government with or without Assad.
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